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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

TALMADGE SELF and CATHY SELF,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
vs.

Case No. 960355-CA

JOSEPH STUMPH, DAVID STUMPH,
and VIRGIL FOSTER,

Priority No. 16

Defendants/Appellees.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to
Utah

Code Ann.

§78-2a-3(2) (k) , §78-2-2(4), and §78-2-2 (3) (j)

(1953, as amended).
ISSUES FOR AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The following questions of law should be reviewed to
determine

whether

the

trial

court's

interpretation

statutes, rules, and ordinances was correct--State v.
865 P.2d 1335, 1337 (Utah 1993):

of

Larsen,

1.

The trial court erred, as a matter of law, in

finding that the plaintiffs failed to extend the option to
purchase the premises as provided for in the Agreement.
2.

The trial court erred in finding that the defendants

were the prevailing parties, and in awarding the defendants,
and not the plaintiffs, their attorneys fees.
Determinative Provisions.
1.

Utah

Code Ann.,

§ 25-5-1(1953, as amended).

2.

Utah

Code Ann.,

§ 25-5-3(1953, as amended),

3.

Utah

Code Ann.,

§ 78-27-56.5 (1953, as amended).

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The Plaintiffs, in or about May, 1995, caused to be filed
their Verified Complaint alleging that defendants had breached
a Lease Agreement with an Option to Purchase which the parties
had entered into in April 1994.

The Verified Complaint sought

specific performance as a remedy, as well as monetary damages
for defendants' alleged breach.

On or about June 29, 1995,

defendants caused to be filed their Answer and Counterclaim,
alleging that plaintiffs were in unlawful detainer of the
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subject premises.
A trial was held in this matter on November 3, 1995.
Following the taking of evidence and testimony, the Court
orally announced its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
The Court found that plaintiffs, in July and August 1994, were
in default of the lease-option agreement

(the "Agreement")

which the parties had previously executed, but also found that
defendant had waived his right to terminate the Agreement by
accepting rental payments which were due on September 15,
1995.

The Court also found that plaintiffs had failed to

validly exercise the option provided for in the Agreement, and
that plaintiffs had failed to indicate to defendant that they
were extending the option for an additional year as provided
for in the Agreement.

Based upon those findings, the Court

held that plaintiffs were month-to month tenants of defendant,
that defendant had properly served plaintiffs with a Three-Day
Notice to Pay Rent or Quit on May 17, 1995, that plaintiffs
were in unlawful detainer, and that a Writ of Restitution
should issue restoring possession of the premises to defendant

3

if plaintiffs had not vacated the premises prior to December
1, 1995.
plaintiffs

The trial court entered
in the amount

of

judgment against

$345.00, in addition

the

to the

defendants' costs of court.
The order appealed from in this case is the Judgment,
orally announced by the trial court following the trial which
was held on November 3, 1995, and entered by the Honorable
Sandra N. Peuler of the Third District Court on November 17,
1995.

Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Judgment was filed with the

trial

court

on

November

13,

1995.

The

Order

denying

plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Judgment was entered by the trial
court on February 20, 1996.

The Notice of Appeal was filed

with the district court on February 28, 1996.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
In or about May 1994, plaintiffs and defendant, Joseph
Stumph (hereinafter referred to as Mefendant"), entered into
a

lease-option

agreement

(hereinafter

referred

to as the

"Agreement") for the premises located at 3160-3170 South 7945
West, Magna, Utah (hereinafter referred to as the "premises").
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The Agreement provided that plaintiffs would pay $1000.00 per
month

as

and

for rent

for the premises.

The

Agreement

specifically provided as follows:
Within one year, until May 1, 1995, Selfs will
have option to purchase property for $70,000.00
(seventy thousand dollars) with a credit of
$200.00 per month being credited toward a down
payment. This option may continue for a second
year thru April 30, 1996, except on May 1, 1995
the $70,000 price will be adjusted upward to
reflect the general price increase of property
in SL County.
The Agreement further provided as follows:
On January 1, 1995 monthly lease payment will
increase to $1,100.00 from $1,000.00 per month
with $200.00 per month continuing to be credited
toward a down payment if Self exercise their
option to purchase. Selfs may continue their
option for a second year until May 1, 1996, but
the $70,000 base price will be adjusted upward
to reflect the general increase in property
values in Salt Lake County according to the
official data of the Salt Lake Board of
Realtors. Such upward adjustment in price shall
not include any actual improvements made to the
property by Selfs, only the general increase in
values of all residential properties in
Salt Lake County.
On May 1, 1995, monthly lease payment will be
reduced to $900.00 per month if Selfs exercise
option for another year, but none of this amount
will be credited toward a down payment if option

5

to purchase is exercised. If option to
purchase is exercised both parties will pay
normal fees as seller and buyer, namely, closing
costs. Unless and until Selfs actually purchase
property, owner will be responsible for property
taxes and fire insurance, but Selfs will be
responsible for renters7 insurance if they wish
to insure their personal property.
The Agreement does not specify the method or means by which
plaintiffs were required to indicate to defendant that they
intended

to

extend

the

option

for

an

additional

year.

Finally, the Agreement provided that if any payment from the
plaintiffs was more than 15 days late, the defendant, at his
option, could terminate the Agreement.
In July 1994, plaintiffs paid to defendant the sum of
$729.00 as and for rent for the premises.

In August 1994,

plaintiffs paid to defendant the sum of $1500.00, constituting
the balance of rent for the month of July 1994, rent for the
month of August 1994, as well as applicable late fees.

This

amount still left $101.00 owing for rent for the month of
August 1994.

During the month of August 1994, plaintiffs were

making substantial improvements to the premises.

At that

time, plaintiffs informed defendant that they would not be
6

able to pay the balance of August's rent because they were
spending

the

money

making

improvements

Plaintiffs asked defendant if he would

to

the premises.

"foreclose" on the

Agreement, to which he responded in the negative.
In September 1994, plaintiffs paid to defendant the sum
of $1501.00, constituting the balance owing for August 1994
rent, September 1994 rent, applicable late fees, as well as
payment of a $400.00 note owing to defendant.

At that point

in time, plaintiffs were current on all payments due under the
Agreement.

Subsequent to plaintiffs making their payment in

September 1994, defendant caused to be served upon plaintiffs
a notice that he was exercising his right to terminate the
Agreement because of their late payments.
Subsequent to September 1994, plaintiffs continued to
make improvements to the premises, and continued to make their
lease

payments

Commencing
defendant

in

to

defendant

January

pursuant

1995, plaintiffs

to

the

made

Agreement.
payments

of $1100.00 per month as and for rent

to

for the

premises pursuant to the Agreement, which defendant accepted
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without

objection.

Defendant

continued

to

accept

these

increased rental payments through April 1995.
In February 1995, plaintiffs exercised their option to
purchase the premises by presenting defendant with an Earnest
Money Agreement setting forth the terms of the purchase as
provided in the Agreement.

Defendant refused to sign the

Earnest Money Agreement, and refused to cooperate with the
plaintiffs in taking the necessary steps to complete the sale
of the premises.

On April 28, 1995, plaintiff Talmadge Self

had a conversation with the defendant in which he informed the
defendant that he would be paying $900.00 rent for May 1995
pursuant to the Agreement.
to defendant
premises

In May 1995, plaintiffs tendered

the sum of $900.00 as and for rent for the

pursuant

to

the

Agreement.

Defendant

refused

plaintiffs' tender, indicating that the rent due was $1100.00,
and caused to be served upon plaintiffs a Three-Day Notice to
Pay

Rent

premises,

or

Quit.

defendant

When
caused

plaintiffs
to

be

filed

asserting a claim for unlawful detainer.

8

did

not
a

vacate

the

Counterclaim,

A trial was held in this matter on November 3, 1995.
Following the taking of evidence and testimony, the Court
orally announced its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
The Court found that plaintiffs, in July and August 1994, were
in default of the lease-option agreement

(the "Agreement")

which the parties had previously executed, but also found that
defendant had waived his right to terminate the Agreement by
accepting rental payments which were due on September 15,
1995.

The Court also found that plaintiffs had failed to

validly exercise the option provided for in the Agreement, and
that plaintiffs had failed to indicate to defendant that they
were extending the option for an additional year as provided
for in the Agreement.

Based upon those findings, the Court

held that plaintiffs were month-to month tenants of defendant,
that defendant had properly served plaintiffs with a Three-Day
Notice to Pay Rent or Quit on May 17, 1995, that plaintiffs
were in unlawful detainer, and that a Writ of Restitution
should issue restoring possession of the premises to defendant
if plaintiffs had not vacated the premises prior to December
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1,

1995,

plaintiffs

The
in

trial

the

court

amount

entered

of

$345.00,

judgment
in

against

addition

to

the
the

defendants' costs of court.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Appellants claim that the trial court erred in holding
that they failed to properly extend the option to purchase the
subject premises for an additional year as provided for in the
Agreement.

However, because the Agreement is silent as to the

method of giving notice of the extension of the option, oral notice
of such intent is sufficient.

Furthermore, evidence was presented

at the trial of thi$ matter establishing that plaintiffs gave
defendants oral notice of their intent to extend the option.

The

trial court therefore erred in holding that plaintiffs had failed
to properly extend the option.
Because the trial court erred in holding that plaintiffs had
failed to properly extend the option, it also erred in finding that
defendants

were

attorney's fees.

the prevailing

parties, and

in awarding

them

The Agreement provides that a party seeking to

enforce the provisions of the Agreement is entitled to an award of
his attorney's fees if he prevails.

Because plaintiffs should have

prevailed on their claim that they properly extended the option,
10

they

should also have prevailed on defendants' Counterclaim.

Because plaintiffs should have been the prevailing parties, they
should have been awarded

their attorney's

fees, rather than

defendants.
ARGUMENT

A.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFFS
FAILED TO EXTEND THE OPTION TO PURCHASE THE PREMISES AS
PROVIDED FOR IN THE AGREEMENT.
In the matter at hand, the trial court found, following

the trial, that appellants had failed to indicate to appellees
that they intended to extend the option for an additional year
as provided for in the Agreement.

The trial court ruled that

because the notice was oral, it violated the Statute of Frauds
and

was

void

and

of

no

effect.

However,

because

the

underlying Agreement was specific in its terms, and was silent
as to the method of giving notice of the intent to extend the
option, oral notice was sufficient to accomplish the extension
of the option.
The Agreement specifically provided as follows:.
Within one year, until May 1, 1995, Selfs will
have option to purchase property for $70,000.00
11

(seventy thousand dollars) with a credit of
$200.00 per month being credited toward a down
payment. This option may continue for a second
year thru April 30, 1996, except on May 1, 1995
the $70,000 price will be adjusted upward to
reflect the general price increase of property
in SL County.
The Addendum to Lease further provided as follows:
On January 1, 1995 monthly lease payment will
increase to $1,100.00 from $1,000.00 per month
with $200.00 per month continuing to be credited
toward a down payment if Self exercise their
option to purchase. Selfs may continue their
option for a second year until May 1, 1996, but
the $70,000 base price will be adjusted upward
to reflect the general increase in property
values in Salt Lake County according to the
official data of the Salt Lake Board of
Realtors. Such upward adjustment in price shall
not include any actual improvements made to the
property by Selfs, only the general increase in
values of all residential properties in Salt
Lake County.

On May 1, 1995, monthly lease payment will be
reduced to $900.00 per month if Selfs exercise
option for another year, but none of this amount
will be credited toward a down payment if option
to purchase is exercised. If option to purchase
is exercised both parties will pay normal fees
as seller and buyer, namely, closing costs.
Unless and until Selfs actually purchase
property, owner will be responsible for property
taxes and fire insurance, but Selfs will be
responsible for renters' insurance if they wish
to insure their personal property.
12

The Agreement does not specify the method or means by which
plaintiffs were required to indicate to defendants that they
intended to extend the option for an additional year.
Counsel

for appellants could not locate any

reported

opinions from Utah discussing the issue of what notice is
necessary to exercise or extend an option agreement when the
agreement itself fails to identify the method of such notice.
However, in Vozar

v.

Francis,

519 P.2d 1056 (Alaska 1978), the

Supreme Court of Alaska addressed an issue nearly identical to
The Vozar

that in the instant matter.

Court addressed a

lease-option agreement which did not identify the method by
which the optioners were required to notify the optionee of
their intent to exercise the option.

The Vozar

Court held

that in the absence of an express requirement in an option to
purchase

agreement

that notice to exercise

the option to

purchase must be in writing, the option may be exercised
verbally or by any other method indicated in the optioner's
election to avail himself of the option.
Although the Vozar

Id.

at 1059-1060.

opinion discusses the method of giving
13

notice

to exercise

an option,

its reasoning may also be

applied to the method by which an optioner is required to give
notice of his intent to extend an option for an additional
period of time.
The Washington Court of Appeals also dealt with a nearly
identical issue in Ban-Co
(Wash.App. 1978).
oral notice

of

Inv.

Co.

v.

Loveless,

587 P. 2d 567

In that case, the court addressed whether

intent

to exercise

an option

property is barred by the Statute of Frauds.

to purchase

The Ban-Co

court

held that it is settled that the acceptance of a written
option to purchase real estate is not invalid because it is
oral.
behind

Id.

at 573.

such

The Ban-Co

position

is

court noted that the rationale

that

the

Statute

of

Frauds

is

sufficiently complied with in such a situation because the
detailed terms of the contract to sell are supplied by the
writing signed by the parties to be held.
The appellees rely on Wardley
Gardens
their

v. Burgess,
argument

Corp.

Id.
Better

Homes

and

810 P.2d 476 (Utah App. 1991), to support
that

the

Statute

14

of

Frauds

requires

the

appellants' notice to extend the option be in writing.

That

opinion, however, is distinguishable from the matter at hand.
In the Wardley

opinion, the Court of Appeals dealt with a real

estate listing agreement that did not provide, in its terms,
for

any

extension

therefore

held

of

that

the
any

agreement.
extension

of

The

Wardley

the

agreement

required to be in writing to be enforceable.
situation in Wardley,

court
was

Unlike the

the Agreement between appellants and

appellees specifically provided, in writing, for the extension
of the Agreement.

The reasoning of the Wardley

court is

therefore not applicable in this matter.
In the matter at hand, the detailed terms of the sale of
the property are contained in the lease-option agreement.

The

parties have therefore sufficiently complied with the Statute
of Frauds.

The oral notice given by appellants to appellees

of their intent to extend the option period for an additional
year, absent any language in the agreement setting forth the
method of giving such notice, was sufficient and evidence of
such

notice

is

not

barred

by

15

the

parol

evidence

rule.

Accordingly, because appellants gave appellees notice of their
intent to extend the option period for an additional year, and
because such notice was not required to be in writing, the
trial

court's ruling should be reversed and remanded

for

further proceedings.
There is also ample evidence in the record supporting the
fact that plaintiffs gave oral notice to the defendants of
their intent to exercise the option.

The evidence establishes

that plaintiff, Talmadge Self, had a conversation with the
defendant, Joseph Stumph, on April

28, 1995

in which he

informed the defendant that he would be paying $900.00 for
May's rent pursuant to the Agreement.

Because the Agreement

provides that the rental payment would decrease to $900.00 per
month in May 1995 if the plaintiffs extended the option for an
additional year, plaintiffs' action in informing the defendant
that he would pay $900.00 in rent for May 1995 constituted
notice that plaintiffs were exercising their right to extend
the option.

Furthermore, plaintiffs tendered to defendant

$900.00 in rent for May 1995, which constitutes additional

16

notice

that plaintiffs were extending their option.

The

defendant refused the $900,00, and indicated instead that the
rent would be $1100.00 per month.

However, because the trial

court ruled that defendant had waived his right to terminate
the Agreement, the Agreement was still in effect on April 28th
when plaintiffs notified defendant that they would be paying
$900.00 in rent for May 1995.

Thus, defendant did not have

the right to refuse plaintiffs' exercise of their right to
extend

the

option,

and

also

did

not

have

the

right

to

unilaterally revise the terms of the Agreement.
Because the evidence establishes that plaintiffs notified
defendant on April 28, 1995 that they would be paying $900.00
rent for May 1995, and because plaintiffs in fact tendered
that amount to defendant, plaintiffs gave notice to defendant
that they wished to extend the option to purchase the property
for an additional year.
silent

on

the

method

Furthermore, because the Agreement is
or means

by

which

plaintiffs

were

required to notify defendant of their intent to extend the
option, the oral notification by plaintiffs was sufficient to
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extend the option.

Therefore, the trial court's ruling should

be reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT DEFENDANTS
WERE THE PREVAILING PARTIES AND IN AWARDING THEM
THEIR ATTORNEY'S FEES.
Following the trial in this matter, the trial court found

that defendants were the prevailing parties in the litigation,
and awarded them a portion of the attorney's fees which they
had incurred in conducting the litigation.

However, because

the trial court erred in ruling that the plaintiffs had failed
to

properly

Agreement,

extend
the

trial

the

option

court

also

as

provided

erred

in

for

in

finding

the
that

defendants were the prevailing parties.
The trial court's ruling should therefore be reversed and
remanded for further proceedings.
The Agreement provides, with regard to attorney's fees,
as follows:
In the event that Owner shall prevail in any legal
action brought by either party to enforce the terms
hereof or relating to the demised premises Owner
shall be entitled to all costs incurred in connection
with such action, including a reasonable attorney's
fee.

18

Under this provision, defendants would be entitled to their
attorney's fees if they prevailed in an action relating to the
Agreement or the demised premises.

However, Utah

Code

Ann.

§78-27-56.5 provides that a party has a reciprocal right to
attorney's fees under such a clause if it prevails.

That

Section provides as follows:
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either
party that prevails in a civil action based upon any
promissory note, written contract, or other writing
executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions
of the promissory note, written contract, or other
writing allows at least one party to recover
attorney's fees.
Utah

Code Ann.
In

the

§78-27-56.5 (1953, as amended).
matter

at

hand,

the

trial

court

found

that

defendants were the prevailing parties, and awarded them a
portion

of

the

attorney's

fees which

they

had

incurred.

However, the trial court erred in ruling for the defendants.
See Part I, supra.
in

awarding

the

Thus, the trial court was also incorrect
defendants

their

attorney's

fees.

Consequently, this matter should be reversed and remanded to
the trial court for further proceedings.

19

CONCLUSION
The Plaintiffs request the following specific relief:
1.

For an Order reversing or remanding the trial court's

decision that th£ plaintiffs failed to properly extend the
option to purchase the subject premises for an additional
year.
2.

For an Order reversing or remanding the trial court's

decision that the defendants
were the prevailing parties and entitled to their attorney's
fees.
3.

For an order awarding the plaintiffs their costs and

attorney's fees on appeal.
RESPECTFULLY

SUBMITTED this

'2Pi

day of July, 1996.

QjL*bfm

£

WENDY M. LEWIS'
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on this /.nCfth
I
day of July, 1996,
I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS to the following:
RALPH D. CROCKETT
4021 South 700 East #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 .
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